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“Buying Greenland is foolish” – or is it?

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The Greenland ice sheet seen from space. Photo: NASA

Recent controversial statements by U.S. President Donald Trump regarding the potential annexation of Greenland – alongside Canada and Panama – have reignited debates over US territorial ambitions in the Arctic and elsewhere. While appearing extraordinary, these proposals are deeply rooted in a long-standing geopolitical tradition. Trump’s rhetoric, though impulsive in its delivery and dismissed as “foolish” by many, aligns with historical U.S. territorial expansionist tendencies.1)Santoro, C M (1992), Diffidence and Ambition. The Intellectual Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy, Westview Press. Today, Greenland remains a lynchpin in Arctic security architecture, ensuring North America’s continental unity and U.S. primacy. This article traces the historical and strategic foundations of US interest in Greenland as a critical asset for hemispheric dominance since the 19th century.

Historical Context of U.S. Interest in Greenland

The United States’ interest in Greenland is not a recent development. It dates back to the mid-19th century, when Secretary of State William H. Seward (1861–1869) argued that the US needed to purchase Alaska from Russia and Greenland and Iceland from Denmark to secure control over the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, respectively. While Alaska was successfully acquired in 1867 – in what contemporaries labeled “Seward’s Folly” – Greenland and Iceland remained under Danish sovereignty. However, Greenland’s strategic importance was far from forgotten.

American interest in Greenland resurfaced after World War I, particularly regarding fishery rights in the North Atlantic. However, it was the outbreak of World War II that brought Greenland’s geopolitical significance into sharp focus, transforming it into a critical military and strategic asset. This shift was driven by three key factors:2)Santoro, C M (1992), Diffidence and Ambition. The Intellectual Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy, Westview Press.

  1. The German Occupation of Denmark (1940): The US feared that Germany’s occupation of Denmark could lead to Berlin claiming Greenland and Iceland, threatening the security of the Western Hemisphere. Greenland was seen as falling within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted U.S. dominance in the Americas.
  2. The Shrinking of Distances: Technological advancements in aviation and naval capabilities during the 20th century had “shrunk the world”, pushing American interventionists and expansionists to argue that traditional US isolationist policy had become untenable.
  3. The Opening of the Arctic: The advent of air power opened Arctic spaces for the first time, forecasting what some termed an “Arctic Mediterranean.”3)Renner, G T (1942), Human Geography in the Air Age. A Text for High School Students, The Macmillan Company, New York. The azimuthal projection centered on the North Pole disrupted the traditional Mercatorian worldview, emphasizing the Arctic as a central theater for global power projection and implying a new center-periphery relationship among world powers. From a north-centric perspective, North America became a natural extension of the Eurasian landmass. Thus, the Heartland became an American affair, revolutionizing what the Monroe Doctrine had successfully prevented for more than a hundred years.4)Vegetti, M, (2017). L’invenzione del globo. Spazio, potere, comunicazione nell’epoca dell’aria (The Invention of the Globe: Space, Power, and Communication in the Age of Air), Einaudi, Torino.

The Continental Unity of North America

During World War II, Greenland was incorporated into the US security system, and Washington effectively established a military protectorate over the island in 1941. Considering the three factors above, this decision was justified by the need to safeguard civil aviation routes, establish reconnaissance networks, and control maritime communication networks in the Atlantic and Arctic. Greenland became not just a piece of land but a critical component of U.S. global strategy and hemispheric defence.

Canada also underwent a process of “de-Anglicization” and “Americanization” during this period, further solidifying U.S. influence in North America. By 1949, it was clear that Canada had become far more interdependent with and integrated into the U.S. than it was with the U.K.5)Watson, J W, (1953), Canada: Power Vacuum, or Pivot Area?, (in:) H.W. Weigert, V. Stefansson, R.E. Harrison (eds.), New Compass of the World. A Symposium on Political Geography, The Macmillan Company, 40-60. This incorporation, alongside the acquisition of Alaska and the strategic integration of Greenland, transformed the US into a complete Arctic power, controlling the northern coastline of what Nicholas Spykman described in 1942 as the “inverted triangle” of North America.6)Spykman, N J (1942), America’s Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power, Yale University. The Panama Canal, which had been opened under US supervision in 1914, had bestowed the status of connected bi-oceanic power upon the US.

Spykman, a leading American geopolitician and one of the most influential of his time, argued in 1942 that Greenland and Alaska formed the northern vertices of this triangle, with the Arctic serving as a gateway for US power projection across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic regions. The southern vertex was anchored at the Panama Canal.

This perspective shaped US foreign policy during and after World War II, leading to a “New Deal” in international relations that combined Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, Cordell Hull’s liberalism, and Nicholas Spykman’s realist balance-of-power approach towards the continental unity of North America and disunity of Eurasia. By World War II’s end, the US had completed its transformation into a “continental island” – a macroregional hegemon projecting power globally through naval dominance, forward bases, and alliance leadership.7)Mearsheimer, J J (2008), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, New York.

Post-War Developments and Greenland’s Role in US Geopolitical Strategy

By the end of World War II, the US had consolidated its hegemony over the North American continent and emerged as a global power: the “American Mediterranean” (the Caribbean) became a U.S. internal lake, allied bases in the Pacific and Atlantic permitted unprecedented global power projection, and key Arctic strategic positions – including Greenland – fell under US or allied control.

During the Cold War, the Arctic’s strategic value grew as it became a potential battleground for superpower conflict. The shortest air routes between the US and USSR crossed the Arctic, making Greenland a vital component of US defense strategy.8)Bykova A (2024) NATO has always been an Arctic Alliance, part 1. The Arctic Institute, 28 May, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-alliance-part-i/. Accessed 10 October 2025. In 1946, President Harry S. Truman even considered annexing Greenland, though his administration ultimately chose not to pursue it. (The US’s last formal annexation occurred in 1959 with Hawaii.)

As the Cold War intensified, the Arctic became a critical theater for US-Soviet rivalry. Greenland’s location made it a key site for early warning systems and military installations, forming the Aleutians-Alaska-Northern Canada-Greenland-Iceland line and further integrating Greenland into the U.S. security network.9)Fioravanzo, G (1979), A History of Naval Tactical Thought, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

The Cold War Arctic was envisioned as a “new World’s Mediterranean” – a sea basin surrounded by the continental shores of North America and Northern Eurasia – reflecting the bipolar world order established at Yalta. The US, despite being an oceanic power, dominated the Arctic’s most strategic locations, while the USSR, despite its extensive Arctic coastline, failed to fully “Sovietize” Northern Eurasia. In the Arctic – as elsewhere – the USSR remained “hemmed in.”10)Fioravanzo, G (1979), A History of Naval Tactical Thought, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

Contemporary Implications

After the Cold War, Greenland’s strategic importance seemed to diminish as the U.S. shifted focus to East Asia and the Middle East, leading to partial demilitarization. This period created the impression of a “return” of control to Denmark and greater Greenlandic agency, an impression fuelled by the circumpolar cooperative environment at play in the Arctic. However, U.S. security concerns merely shifted: under the rhetoric of supporting “international peace,” Washington’s primary concern became the establishment of missile-defense capabilities (also in Thule/Pituffik) against so-called rogue states.

However, recent developments have reignited US interest not only in Greenland, but also in Canada and Panama. Climate change is transforming the Arctic, opening new shipping routes and unlocking vast natural resources. Greenland’s location once again places it at the centre of global power dynamics.

Moreover, Russia’s assertiveness and China’s growing presence in the Arctic have rebalanced power relations, challenging US regional dominance. Whereas during the unipolar moment Washington effectively controlled both shores of the “Arctic Mediterranean,” today a new geopolitical dividing line separates US-aligned and Russia-China-aligned bounded orders. Consequently, the value of Arctic strategic positions is rising. The shift is compounded by growing doubts in Washington about the capacity of Denmark and other European allies to deter or withstand potential Russian or Chinese pressure in the region. Maintaining a strong presence in Greenland also serves to preserve cohesion within the US-bounded order, limiting the strategic autonomy of allies and discouraging neutral or ambiguous postures towards the rivals.

Within this context, Trump’s statements about purchasing Greenland can be read less as an expression of territorial ambition than as a strategic signal – a warning to allies and competitors alike about the island’s enduring importance to US security.11)Zellen B S (2025) Greenland During Trump 2.0: Is America Poised for an Historic Arctic Territorial Expansion?, The Arctic Institute, 21 January, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/greenland-during-trump-2-0-america-poised-historic-arctic-territorial-expansion/. Accessed on 10 October 2025 Greenland remains an essential component of the US strategic network in the Arctic and North Atlantic, alongside Canada and Panama. These territories define the perimeter of the North American continent and enable Washington to project power across the surrounding seas. Their significance cannot be overstated, though outright annexation would risk opening a Pandora’s box with unpredictable consequences.

More than a concrete proposal, Trump’s declarations underscored Greenland’s renewed salience in a shifting geopolitical and geophysical Arctic environment. If such rhetoric is folly, it is a folly deeply rooted in American history and strategic culture – after all, who today would call the purchase of Alaska a folly?

Marco Ghisetti is a PhD Candidate and Junior Researcher at the University of Lapland (Finland).

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